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Artificial Intelligence systems that will augment human performance, improve safety, 
output and efficiency are entering countless domains. However, automated systems fall 
victim to automation bias in their design, operation, and oversight, which can cause 
complacent human operators to allow system failures. As functioning AI systems, 
autonomous vehicles (AVs) have led to serious and unexpected accidents. Despite 
limited research into the circumstances around AV system breakdown so far, we believe 
the failures that have occurred can offer insight into the dynamic of human-AI 
partnership. We performed an analysis of the available information on the 4 most 
well-documented AV accidents. Findings reveal that automation bias and complacency 
during unanticipated situations lead to the humans’ failure to take control of the system 
and prevent accidents. This follows a predictable pattern and, despite research into 
automation bias, human factors such as trust, complacency, and awareness are not a 
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“Early automation history in aviation includes many examples in which automation was introduced 
because the industry had the technological capability to do it. They learned from experience that 
automation “because we can” does not necessarily make the human-automation system work 
better. That resulted in an evolution toward “human-centric” automation, in which the objective was 
improving the overall performance of the human-automation system. This crash is an example of 
what can happen when automation is introduced “because we can” without adequate consideration 
of the human element. “ 
-​NTSB board member statement (​NTSB, 2017​)  
This message, appended to the report documenting the first American fatal accident 
involving a semi-autonomous vehicle, admonished the manufacturer (Tesla) for 
deploying a smart driving system called ‘Autopilot’. The US National Transportation 
Safety Board officially determined that the driver (failing to intervene as his car drove 
itself under the trailer of an 18-wheeler) and the truck driver ( who turned improperly in 
front of the oncoming vehicle) were at fault, but they cited the autonomous system 
design as a contributing factor. Tesla’s CEO Elon Musk has stated via twitter “[Autopilot] 
certainly needs to be better & we work to improve it every day, but perfect is enemy of 
good. A system that, on balance, saves lives & reduces injuries should be released.” 
(​Musk, 2018​). We believe that this is just the beginning of a debate around the adoption 
of complex AI systems into all facets of human life. We need to understand this 
partnership, its impediments, and how to create more common ground between AI and 
human partners, so we examine the case of autonomous vehicle (AV) accidents. 
Today, artificial intelligence (AI) in connected devices and web-based applications are 
common. Smart homes, delivery devices, medical diagnosis and surgical systems, 
manufacturing robots, AVs, and far more complex systems are coming. Many of these  
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AIs are already here, augmenting human abilities. Unfortunately, their limitations will not 
always match human operators’ mental models; there can be breakdowns (​Amodei et 
al., 2016​), and those breakdowns have already cost lives (​NTSB, 2017​, ​NTSB, 
November 2019​). So far, incidences of system breakdown have been rare, but their 
impact severe, which calls for greater understanding of breakdowns in AI-enabled 
systems. 
Smart systems aren’t just tools. They react to, monitor, interpret and influence the 
behaviors and actions of the human operator. Computers and smart systems are 
becoming cognitive agents that make decisions and take action as partners. Their 
capabilities and impact on our lives keep increasing. In some cases they already provide 
safety oversight of humans, as with Apple Watches calling emergency services for their 
fallen owners (​Dormehl, L, 2018​). In the near future, banking, calling customer service, 
check-in at the airport and even crossing the street could involve interacting with an AI, 
or a human - AI partnership. Acting as an AI collaborator or supervisor will become 
commonplace. 
Supervising an automated system is a deceptively complicated job. Anyone in this role is 
susceptible to automation bias and complacency. Vigilance and awareness are required 
of the human in this role as they watch for errors and either take over or discontinue 
operation. The human is expected to simultaneously monitor the AI’s output and its 
system status. They tend toward trusting the system and become complacent, because 
normal operation is monotonous and errors or breakdowns are rare (​Lee and See, 2004​, 
Bainbridge, 1983​). The human is the final safeguard against unexpected or catastrophic 
failure. This role is paradoxical; humans are required for oversight when their ability to 
vigilantly monitor system operations is most likely to fall victim to complacency. Human 
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operators of highly automated systems are also more likely to be blamed for mistakes 
committed by this partnership than the companies designing the systems (​Awad et al., 
2019​). Our findings suggest that the system design can and should share the 
responsibility, and we aim to explore automation bias’s role on the readiness and ability 
of a human operator to take control in the face of failure. 
With take-over, the human operator is the final and most obvious line of defense 
between risk and catastrophe, but they are not the only one. Reason’s swiss cheese 
model (​Reason, 2006​) of accident analysis (SCM) is often applied to better understand 
the complexity of failures in design (latent failures) and performance (active failures) that 
contribute to catastrophic system failure of a human - AI partnership. The SCM does not 
assign fault, and operates on the principle that when specific holes in each line of 
defense align, accidents occur, making it ideal for our analysis. 
As highly automated systems become commonplace and sophisticated in medicine, 
government, finance, and public safety, the need to assess and understand how these 
systems might fail, what is needed from human partners and operators during failures, 
and how these failures can be better prevented also grows. Bur conceptualizing AI can 
be challenging, so we focus on the context of autonomous vehicle (AV)  accidents. 
Why Autonomous Vehicles? 
Automotive manufacturers have been held accountable for unsafe designs since the 
60’s​ ​(​NHTSA, 2016​). Because of the history of accountability and transparent 
investigation of fatal accidents, there is considerable data available. The concept of 
software as a cognitive agent to be inspected and held accountable in the face of 
catastrophe is a comparatively unprecedented and unregulated situation. The presence 
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of AVs on the road, fatal accidents, and governing bodies (NHTSA, NTSB) investigating 
the accidents and publicly reporting findings, gives us the chance to learn how to build 
safer systems. 
AVs are currently operating on the road. Many people already have a mental model of 
driverless cars (​Gkartzonikas and Gkritza, 2019​). AVs have been involved in several 
accidents, some serious, some fatal. They therefore offer a singular opportunity to learn 
from actual breakdowns of human-AI interaction, and to reveal the multi-faceted, 
complex nature of AI breakdowns as dynamic socio-technical systems which involve 
errors of the human operator, the third party (another human), the AV behavior, and the 
AV design. 
Research questions: 
AV accidents have been relatively rare to this point, though some have been fatal and 
almost all of them could be avoided by a sober, attentive human driver. Given that, we 
seek to answer the questions: 
● What are the impediments in establishing common ground between human and 
AI in partnership? 
● How does the design of intelligent machines contribute to these breakdowns? 
● How does operator automation bias confound take-over? 
We use the swiss cheese model of accident analysis (​Reason, 2006​) to analyze reports 
of accidents from the US National Transit & Safety Bureau (NTSB) involving 
semi-autonomous vehicles, and Stake’s model of multiple case analysis (​Stake, 2013​) to 
compare our findings across cases. Through our analysis of these accidents, we 
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discover several common threads which reveal pitfalls and paradoxes of designing 
complex systems to work autonomously while still depending on human awareness for 
oversight and accident prevention. We will discuss how these pitfalls are not unique to 
AV, and could have serious impact on the deployment of complex systems that would 
team human operators with AI. 
Literature Review 
Some AIs require human oversight (a human in the loop), some are designed to operate 
autonomously. They promise greater efficiency and improved safety (​Taiebat et al., 
2018​), and will therefore gradually be adopted. With this adoption, new avenues of 
communication and collaboration will emerge, such as human-AI, AI-AI, and 
Human-Centaur (that is, human augmented by or collaborating with AI (​Swartout, 2016​)). 
AIs act as intelligent agents, making suggestions and/or taking action, and can influence 
or directly impact the physical world. Complex and powerful applications for AI are being 
developed to handle high frequency stock trades, traffic patterns and driving vehicles. 
Neural networks use machine learning to improve using past experiences with both 
supervised (with feedback or information provided from a human in the loop) and 
unsupervised techniques (without any human confirmation of their learning) making them 
ever more powerful.  Advances in AI allow Google, Amazon, Apple and Microsoft to 
introduce increasingly capable virtual assistants and show that AI can operate as an 
intelligent actor in human computer interaction. Any of these systems, when paired with 
a human operator, are susceptible to human complacency and a lack of awareness, 
both problems of automation bias. 
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The complexity of algorithms increase with every use, narrow AIs demonstrate behavior 
that reminds us of intuition in their operation. This was recently demonstrated by 
Google’s AlphaZero, an AI developed to learn to play chess, shogi, and go with no 
human training or assistance. The system was given the rules of chess and 4 hours to 
play itself. After that AlphaZero was able to defeat the reigning computer chess 
champion, Stockfish,  and only began losing to Stockfish when it was given 1/30th of the 
time to make its moves (​Silver et al., 2018​). AlphaZero also developed effective winning 
strategies previously considered unacceptable and unwinnable by chess masters. Chess 
has also been one of the first arenas for human-AI collaboration, where teams of 
chessmasters pairing with chess engines, called centaurs, determine the next and most 
winnable moves. These teams, called centaurs, have been extremely successful in 
chess tournaments and have shown themselves to be more effective than AI acting 
alone. In doing so, they present a strong case for the potential for human - AI 
collaboration in other fields. 
In Human-AI partnership, AI systems perform tasks suited to routine, repetitive, logical 
tasks​ ​(​Jarrahi 2018​)​ of increasing complexity, while the human provides a set of skills yet 
to be reproduced by AI systems, which include intuitive grasping of complexity (​Jarrahi, 
2018​) and paradoxical information (​Russell and Norvig, 2016​) along with “navigation and 
interaction with complex, dynamic 3-dimensional space” (​Russel and Norvig, pp 
971-1019,  2016​). The human would also serve as a fail-safe to ensure that the AI is 
functioning correctly and to provide intuition and judgement needed to prevent accidents 




Partial autonomy: design and behavior  
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) have rated autonomous vehicles at six 
levels of autonomy, from 0 (no autonomy) to 5 (complete and comprehensive 
autonomy). Levels 0-2 represent systems of increasing sophistication that progressively 
augment human performance but should require constant human control. At level 2 (L2), 
the AI would be approaching autonomy during basic operation. Levels 3-6 represent 
autonomous systems that require gradually less human oversight or involvement. At L3, 
the AI would act as an autonomous entity, but could still be expected to request human 
take-over with little notice. L4 would operate completely autonomously within specified 
parameters, and with human control outside of those parameters. At L5, the system 
would not have operational parameters that limit its function, and would not require 
human oversight or assistance. 
SAE Levels of automation 
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
No automation 
Machine 



























human is not 
required 
Human is driving System is driving 
From a legal perspective, up to level 2 the human is driving. L2 is an intermediary 
between today and the future of autonomous operation. Primarily, L2 and L4 
autonomous vehicles are on the road today. Tesla’s autopilot is the most well known 
extant L2 self driving system. It only functions on highways, but to date has logged 
nearly 2 billion miles of operation (​Fridman, 2019​). From the perspective of the driver, it 
is highly autonomous and responsive to road and traffic conditions. However, it is still 
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completely reliant on a human operator being aware and ready to take over. Because of 
the potential for catastrophe, Waymo (formerly Google) and many other AV developers 
are focusing their attention of L4, with ambitions of L5. In cars, L2-L3 is not ideal, and 
automakers are working to move beyond, but If the purpose of a given AI is symbiosis 
with or augmentation of a human operator (​Jarrahi, 2018​), level 2-3 autonomous 
vehicles represent a testing ground for real world functionality and breakdowns. 
Take-over 
The moment in which operational control is transitions from the human to the AI, or the 
AI to the human is known as take-over (​Gold et al., 2013​, ​Melcher et al., 2015​). 
Take-over may be requested by the human operator to free up their attention or for safe 
and reliable operation. In other cases, the system can request take-over because the 
situation it is facing is beyond its operational parameters. In the case of AVs, the system 
should handle the majority of operations during optimal conditions (low traffic, clear 
weather, minimal or no pedestrians), and should request take-over for the unexpected. 
This is a key feature of partially autonomous vehicles, but it did not occur in any of the 
accidents we are examining, nor in any other documented AV accidents. AVs are 
designed with a human-out-of-the loop architecture (​Gold et al., 2013​), in which the 
human is only aware of what is happening if they choose to pay attention. For L2 
autonomy, the legal and practical expectation is that the driver is aware and actively 
operating the vehicle. However, the users we examine below did not behave accordingly 
and were not actively operating the vehicle. 
Research has been dedicated to understanding strategies for requesting take-over in 
time for the human operator to to take decisive action that rivals what the AV would do 
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on its own based on notification timing (​Gold et al., 2013​), human operator age (​Körber 
et al., 2016​), human operator activity prior to take-over request (​Happee et al., 2017​, 
Zeeb et al., 2016​), notification type (​Melcher et al., 2015​), and whether steering or 
braking is needed (​Zeeb et al., 2017​). Findings generally indicate that as the vehicle 
automation and human operator distraction increase, more time and clearer instruction is 
needed for safe and effective take-over, and that relative inconsistency in system 
performance increases human operator vigilance. 
We believe take-over can be used even more broadly to refer to any situations in which 
control is abruptly transitioned between an AI and its human user. In the future, there is 
also a likelihood that systems will be capable of taking operation over from an 
incapacitated or dangerous human operator. Problems with human operator take-over 
have been attributed to a combination of operator complacency and a bias toward 
automation (​Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010​) 
Automation bias: automation can supercede human cognition 
Timely and effective take-over decreases because of human operator bias in favor of 
automation. There is a tendency to trust the automated function, and the trust increases 
the more the human observes the system working (​Skitka et al., 2000​). This contributes 
to two types of errors: 
● Errors of omission​: A human does not intercede or react, trusting the 
performance of the system over their own judgement (​Skitka et al., 2000​). 
● Errors of commission​: The human absent-mindedly follows the system 
instructions in place of using their own judgement (​Skitka et al., 2000​). 
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Both errors occur for three reasons: 
● Empirical level:​ The user has observed the system functioning properly; this 
aspect of automation bias is likely to increase over time, and vanish for a time 
after failure  (​Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010​). 
● Instructional level:​ The user has been told the system is better at its job than a 
human would be (​Bainbridge, 1983​) 
● Design level: ​The likelihood of poor decisions (or lack thereof) on the part of the 
human operator is significantly impacted by the design of the system (​Lee & See, 
2004​, ​Goddard et al., 2011​) 
The system’s decision-making processes becomes a heuristic replacement for vigilant 
information seeking and processing (​Mosier & Skitka, 1996​). When the goal is to 
improve response times and reduce the risk of injury or damage, this has very serious 
implications for human-AI partnerships. The human operator is asked to supervise the 
system while being told that the system is better at the job than they are (​Bainbridge, 
1983​). The human operator’s job is not to run the system, so the system is running itself 
and the human is increasingly unable to recognize problems beyond the system’s scope. 
The impact on the human is blind compliance with system instructions, failure to 
intervene, or hesitation in the face of system errors and catastrophic failure. Facing 
automated system failure, even a vigilant human operator’s response time will be 
delayed. After system failure, their willingness to trust the automated system is 
disproportionately diminished (​Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010​).  
Automation bias has been observed and documented across several industries, with 
early literature looking at nuclear power, space exploration, manufacturing and autopilot 
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systems (​Wachtel, 2018​), and more recent research into medicine (​Bond et al., 2018​) 
and autonomous vehicles (also called trust in automation) (​Gold at al., 2015​). 
Automation-related complacency 
Once human operators spend time working with complex, automated systems, their trust 
can lead to complacency (​Lee and See, 2004​), and  generally inattentive, compliant 
behavior.  An overly compliant human is a well documented phenomenon in the human 
oversight of complex automated systems (​Singh et al., 1993​, ​de Visser et al., 2012​, 
Schaefer et al., 2016​). As a result of trust in automation, the human operator’s attention 
declines significantly when the tasks are highly automated and the system is consistent 
in its performance (​Lee and See, 2004​). Automation-related complacency has 3 basic 
types, and they can co-occur: 
1. Not looking​: Overt redirection of visual attention when sampling relevant 
information needed to verify an automated aid. 
2. Distraction​: Less attentive processing of information; attention may be allocated 
elsewhere. 
3. Ignoring one’s own perception​: Discounting information that contradicts the 
recommendation of the aid because of either difficulties in comprehension or an 
over-reliance on the automated source (​Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010​). 
Frankly, it’s not very interesting or engaging to watch a system function as it should, and 
it is reasonable for human operators to assume that a market-ready system will perform 
its duty competently. In short, a complacent operator paired with automation bias is a 
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recipe for system breakdown. Automation-related complacency occurs with and can feed 
automation bias (​Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010​). 
Automation bias and awareness 
It is equally important to consider the effect of complacency and automation bias on a 
human operator’s level of awareness. We want to differentiate their attitude toward 
paying attention (vigilance or complacency) with the amount of information that the 
operator has about the situation at hand. Situational awareness is a measure that 
determines a person’s ability to act based on their knowledge of present events. This is 
ranked from the operator’s ability to perceive what is going on (level 1) to having 
sufficient knowledge to comprehension what is going on (level 2) to their ability to make 
future predictions of future status (level 3) (​Endsley et al., 2000​). It may not be possible 
to map out the human operator’s level of situational awareness at the time of the 
accident, particularly when the human operator is either deceased or under 
investigation, so we cannot be precise in our measurement of their situational 
awareness. Instead, we attempt to determine the interplay between complacency, 
automation bias and operator awareness in the face of AV accidents. 
AV Accidents  
Despite their rarity, AV accidents are sensational and uncanny; they are accidents any 
reasonably attentive, sober driver would easily avoid. Marketing materials involving 
driverless cars often refer to an NTSB report attributing 94% of all motor vehicle 
accidents to human error (​NHTSA, 2015​). They assert that autonomous vehicles will 
eliminate 94% of accidents (​Waymo, 2019​), but the accidents we examine paint a more 
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complicated picture. Future accidents may be attributed to automation or automation 
bias and complacency on the part of the designers or human operators. In fact, AVs 
have not yet accumulated enough experience on the road to support this claim (​Kalra 
and Paddock, 2016​). AVs are fully functional AI robots, and control of the vehicle is in 
many ways less complicated than manufacturing or household robots. AVs have a 
relatively simple operation; latitudinal (turning/steering) and longitudinal (acceleration 
and braking) control and follow a demarcated path using a built-in, GPS assisted map. 
The complexity of these systems arises from the need for them to respond to the 
behavior of humans, animals and the impact of weather on road conditions 
Swiss cheese model of accident analysis 
SCM is a metaphor for breakdowns and accidents 
that don’t have a single, simple causation 
(​Reason et al., 2006​). It described an accident as 
a risk or hazard that passes through successive 
holes in slices of swiss cheese. When the risk 
reaches the other side, it becomes a loss.  
SCM is used extensively to analyze failures in medicine and airplane accidents. In all 
situations, design, oversight, procedure and the conditions of all parts and parties should 
individually and collectively help to prevent accidents. The swiss cheese model 
describes each of these components as another imperfect line of defense (or slice) 
against failure. The SCM describes the accident first as a hazard moving through each 
slice until it results in loss. Each slice is revealed to have a hole in it, which is referred to 
as a failure. When a failure could not have been prevented by any of the active 
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participants in the accident, this is a latent or design failure. When the failure was in the 
decision making process of active participants, this is an active or decision failure. 
Because SCM is particularly suited to parsing an accident into component pieces, it is 
employed to help us better understand Human-AI relationship and identify the many 
ways that relationship is challenged during breakdowns. 
Methods 
The bulk of our analysis involves interpreting findings from the US National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) documentation of accident investigations. These 
documents are publicly released and include preliminary and final reports of fatal 
accidents, and have taken a special interest in the circumstances surrounding AV 
accidents. NTSB accident reports carefully analyze the conditions, behaviors, and 
witness reports surrounding an accident. They look at the weather, lighting, condition of 
vehicles and drivers prior to the crash and finally the actions taken by all actors. In the 
case of AV accidents, there is also an analysis of the design, capabilities, and behaviors 
of the AV. 
Data collection 
Our case study analysis is based on information from all US AV accidents to date for 
which there is thorough documentation. To date, the NTSB has released a final report of 
3 accidents involving partial AVs (​NTSB, 2017​, ​NTSB, June 2019​, ​NTSB, July 2019​), 
and relatively comprehensive preliminary report (​NTSB, 2018​) and synopsis of a public 
board meeting in which NTSB findings were publicly announced (​NTSB, November 
2019​). The accident on March 18, 2018 (​NTSB, 2018​, ​NTSB, November 2019​),has also 
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been widely documented and publicized; dashcam videos of the road and the human 
operator along with court decisions not to prosecute the human operator are available 
online. NTSB has released preliminary reports with very limited documentation and 
insufficient data from accidents on March 23, 2018 and March 1, 2019. The 
circumstances of those accidents resemble those of January 22, 2018 and May 7, 2016, 
respectively. Due to limited documentation, those accidents are excluded from this 
analysis, but should be considered for future research. 
The state of California has mandated that all accidents involving AVs be documented 
and made available to the general public. Of the 217 accidents on record, only 1, on 
February 14, 2016, was the fault of the AV (​California DMV, 2019​). A Google level 4 AV 
struck a bus at 2 mph while attempting to merge into the bus’s lane (​California DMV, 
2019​). There was no publicly documented investigation of this accident and so there is 
sparse documentation. Although there are more than 200 reports available (roughly 75% 
were caused by other drivers, usually minor rear endings), they contain no relevant 
revelatory information and are therefore excluded from our analysis. 
Data Analysis 
The SCM has gone through several iterations since its introduction in 1990. We choose 
to use the 1997 variation, in which failures are described generally from the most latent, 
also known as the ‘blunt’ end, to the most active, or the ‘sharp’ end. The blunt end 
usually involves system limitations and problems with the design. The sharp end are the 
errors that occurred during the accident, including the human operator’s reaction to the 
situation. For context in an automobile accident, the absence of a streetlight could be 
seen as a latent, or design failure while headlights being off would be an active or 
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decision failure. As the holes in each slice align, the likelihood of an accident increases. 
In this way, the SCM allows us to retrospectively identify each slice and find the hole that 
allowed, and opportunities to add additional slices in order to prevent future accidents. It 
is not our intention to assign blame in any of these accidents; instead we highlight the 
role that automation bias and complacency play in each event, and offer a methodology 
for designers of AI systems to identify opportunities to avoid future system failures. 
SCM is a simple metaphor; each component of the accident serves as a potential 
deterrent of any given accident (slice), and when the holes in each slice align, the 
likelihood of an accident becomes greater (​Reason et al., 2006​). Starting at the blunt 
end, we identify the slice and describe the hole until we reach the most unplanned 
actions at the sharp end. 
We perform a swiss cheese analysis of the various levels of defense that should help to 
prevent breakdown and look for commonalities that could offer insight into successfully 
designing AIs for human symbiosis. Each accident report was carefully examined for any 
information regarding failures of judgement, failures of design, or questionable 
situations. In the SCM, each failure represents a hole in a layer of defense (a slice), and 
the slice was determined from that.  Although there are clear commonalities between 
each accident, they are each unique and therefore different slices and respective holes 
were identified for each accident. Once a complete picture was formed for each of the 
accidents, we then looked for commonalities across the cases. 
Using multiple case study analysis protocol (​Stake, 2013​) , we analyze the 4 available 
case studies based on our themes: automation bias in system design, awareness, 
complacency, take-over, and system limitations. After assessing the prominence of 
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evidence for each theme within every case study, we then look at the evidence for each 
theme across cases, and examine the strength of merged findings. 
Findings 
Below is a description of each accident. They are described in narrative form, including 
the summation and  findings from the NTSB report and a synopsis of the manufacturer’s 
response to the incident. What follows is the swiss cheese analysis for that specific 
accident in the form of a table, with each row representing a slice. Each slice is named 
and described, while the hole in that slice is described along with whether it was an 
active or latent failure. Latent failures (​LF​) exist prior to the incident and reveal some sort 
of a design flaw. Active failures (​AF​) are the errors that occur in the moment, and 
represent behaviors of the humans and AVs involved during the accident. 
In each case, we see that the system could not react properly, take-over failed to occur, 
and that automation bias and complacency was a contributing factor. Given that, we 
break our findings into themes of relevance to our findings: 
Theme 1: ​Design 
The hole in this slice can be directly linked to automation bias in the design of the 
system. 
Theme 2: ​Awareness 
The hole in this slice was that the human operator did not know what was happening 
Theme 3: ​Complacency 
The hole in this slice can be directly linked to an automation bias error of omission 
(inaction) 
Theme 4: ​Limitations 
The hole in this slice was the system’s inability to handle the situation 
Theme 5: ​Take-over 
The hole in this slice was the failure of the human to take-over from the AV 
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We consider the documentation for each hole and slice to determine whether each hole 
is relevant to our research themes and, if it is, the thematic relevance is listed in the final 
column of the swiss cheese analysis. Note: there is one other label given in each case, 
“​edge case​” for slices that involve road conditions and 3rd party behaviors. These are 
the slices that made this situation an edge case. While they are extremely relevant to the 
situation, they do not factor into our analysis as they do not pertain to the human-AI 
partnership. There is, however, a potential for future research into the role of the 3rd 
party. (see “​Future Research​”) 
Cases 
Case A: ​Tesla Model S, May 7, 2016 
Case Study Report Title:​ Collision Between a Car Operating With Automated Vehicle 
Control Systems and a Tractor-Semitrailer Truck Near Williston, Florida May 7, 2016. 
Summary of events​: “At 4:36 p.m. eastern daylight time on Saturday, May 7, 2016, a 
2015 Tesla Model S 70D car, traveling eastbound on US Highway 27A (US-27A), west 
of Williston, Florida, struck a refrigerated semitrailer powered by a 2014 Freightliner 
Cascadia truck-tractor. At the time of the collision, the truck was making a left turn from 
westbound US-27A across the two eastbound travel lanes onto NE 140th Court, a local 
paved road. The car struck the right side of the semitrailer, crossed underneath it, and 
then went off the right roadside at a shallow angle. The impact with the underside of the 
semitrailer sheared off the roof of the car.” (​NTSB, 2017​ page vi) 
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NTSB findings​: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the Williston, Florida, crash was the truck driver’s failure to yield the right of way 
to the car, combined with the car driver’s inattention due to overreliance on vehicle 
automation, which resulted in the car driver’s lack of reaction to the presence of the 
truck. Contributing to the car driver’s overreliance on the vehicle automation was its 
operational design, which permitted his prolonged disengagement from the driving task 
and his use of the automation in ways inconsistent with guidance and warnings from the 
manufacturer.  (​NTSB, 2017​ page 42) 
Analyst’s Synopsis:​ This was the first case of a death in the US where partial 
autonomy was involved. A male driver with a history of posting his experiences using 
Tesla’s Autopilot system, and how reliable he believed it to be. As it traveled at 74 mph 
on a Florida highway with Autopilot activated, the car drove under a tractor trailer that 
turned in front of it. 
Tesla response​: Tesla issued a fleetwide system update (Autopilot version 8) which 
reduced the amount of time a driver could take hands off the steering wheel, and 
implementing a ‘3 strikes rule’ which disables autopilot functions if it has to issue 3 
warnings until the end of the trip. 
Swiss cheese analysis of Case A 





Tesla was equipped with radar, 
ultrasonic sensors and cameras to 
detect other vehicles and obstacles 
as well as software powered by a 
neural network to classify objects 
and predict trajectories 
Tesla failed to classify a semi passing in 
front of it as an obstruction, nor was it 
able to alert the driver of an anomaly 
LF limitation 
AV function Tesla has traffic aware cruise control, autosteer and auto, lane change, 
Vehicle did not react to the semi turning 
in front of it by slowing or taking evasive LF limitation 
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n of human 
awareness 
Tesla uses hands on the steering 
wheel as an indicator that the human 
operator is aware. 
Tesla allowed the driver to go for 








Driver must understand the 
requirements of level 2 automation. 
Level 2 automation requires the 
human to be aware and ready to take 
over at all times.  
Driver had posted YouTube videos of 





Other drivers must respond 
appropriately 
The other vehicle was cited for failure to 
yield AF Edge case 
3rd party 
condition 
Other drivers must be able to 
respond appropriately 
The other driver tested positive for 




Because the driver is operating an L2 
AV, the human operator must serve 
as a fail-safe for functional failures on 
the part of the AV or 3rd parties 
Human operator made contact with the 
wheel for 25 seconds over the 37 
minutes prior to the crash 
AF Awareness, complacency 
AV 
behavior 
AV should detect and classify any 
objects that obstruct its movement. 
At L2 automation it is not required to 
inform the human operator, as they 
are supposed to be alert and aware 
at all times. 
Tesla failed to classify the trailer as an 




The driver should initiate take-over 
as soon as they see anything 
unexpected happening on the road 
No touch or torque was detected on the 
steering wheel and no pressure applied 
to the pedals of the Tesla prior to the 
crash. 
AF Take-over, awareness 
Situational Constraints: ​There was an impaired 3rd party behaving inappropriately in 
the path of the AV. 
Uniqueness among Other Cases: ​AI inability to classify a highly recognizable object 
during daytime operation 
Theme Prominence of theme Utility of case for developing theme 
1 Design Strong System allowed the human operator to go for several minutes without hands on the wheel, 
several times during the 37 minutes prior to the crash. 
2 Awareness Strong The human operator did not touch the wheel for 1:51 minutes preceding the accident. 
3 Complacency Strong Despite the built in warnings, the human repeatedly let the vehicle drive unsupervised until it 
issued and auditory warning (6 times). 
4 Limitations Strong System was unable to classify a tractor trailer perpendicular to the car, did not take evasive 
action, brake, or notify the human operator that there was a problem. 
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5 Take-over Strong No human inputs (torque on the wheel or pressure to the brakes) were detected in the 1:51 
minutes prior to the crash. 
Findings:  
● Partial autonomy cannot yet handle all scenarios 
● Human operators learn to trust the capability of partially autonomous systems, 
becoming complacent and failing to maintain vigilance 
● Absent a clear indication that there is a problem, the human is unlikely to detect 
an obstacle that is not detected by the system. 
● The design of the partially autonomous system failed to mitigate automation 
related complacency. 
● Human operator was not aware of the hazard with ample time to react 
● Human Operator’s ability to effectively react was impaired. 
● Take-over did not effectively happen 
Excerpts relevant to the multicase report:  
“There was no record indicating that the Tesla’s automation system identified the truck that was 
crossing in the car’s path or that it recognized the impending crash. Because the system did not 
detect the combination vehicle—either as a moving hazard or as a stationary object—Autopilot did 
not reduce the vehicle’s speed, the FCW did not provide an alert, and the AEB did not activate.” 
(page 15-16) 
“The NTSB concludes that the Tesla’s automated vehicle control system was not designed to, and 
did not, identify the truck crossing the car’s path or recognize the impending crash; consequently, 
the Autopilot system did not reduce the car’s velocity, the FCW system did not provide an alert, and 
the AEB did not activate.” (page 30) 
“Driving is a highly visual task, so the driver’s touching the steering wheel may not accurately 
indicate that he or she is fully engaged with the driving task. Simply checking whether the driver 
has placed a hand on the steering wheel gives little indication of where the driver is focusing his or 
her attention.” (page 34) 
“Although the operational design of the Tesla Autopilot requires an attentive driver as an integral 
system element, the Autopilot on the Williston crash vehicle allowed the driver to operate in the 
automated control mode for almost 6 minutes, during which the system did not detect the driver’s 
hands on the steering wheel.” (page 35) 
“A more recent simulation study for all types of vehicles estimated that 19–35 percent of straight 
crossing path intersection crashes could be prevented if both vehicles were equipped with 




“If automated vehicle control systems do not automatically restrict their own operation to those 
conditions for which they were designed and are appropriate, the risk of driver misuse remains.” 
(page 41) 
“The Tesla driver’s pattern of use of the Autopilot system indicates an overreliance on the 
automation and a lack of understanding of system limitations.” (page 41) 
“The Tesla driver was not attentive to the driving task, but investigators could not determine from 
the available evidence the reason for his inattention.” (page 41) 
 “The way that the Tesla Autopilot system monitored and responded to the driver’s interaction with 
the steering wheel was not an effective method of ensuring driver engagement.” (page 41) 
This crash demonstrates that not all owners will read and follow the owner’s manual, so the 
automated systems must be designed to function only in circumstances for which they were 
designed rather than leaving that decision up to the driver. (board member statement, page 45) 
Case B: ​Navya Arma shuttle, November 8, 2017 
Case Study Report Title: ​Low-Speed Collision Between Truck-Tractor and Autonomous 
Shuttle, Las Vegas, Nevada, November 8, 2017. 
Summary of events​ (from the NTSB report): “About 12:07 p.m. on Wednesday, 
November 8, 2017, a minor collision occurred on South 6th Street in downtown Las 
Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, between a truck-tractor combination vehicle, operated by 
a 48-year-old driver, and a 2017 Navya Arma autonomous shuttle, carrying 7 
passengers and a 38-year-old attendant. The shuttle, manufactured by Navya and 
operated by Keolis North America, was on a 0.6-mile designated loop beginning and 
ending at a downtown shopping center known as Container Park (the buildings are 
repurposed shipping containers or modular cubes).The combination vehicle, a 2006 
International truck-tractor pulling a 2010 Utility refrigerated trailer, was backing into an 
alley west of South 6th Street while on a delivery route for US Foods when it struck the 
shuttle.” (​NTSB, 2019​, page 1) 
NTSB findings​:The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the collision between the truck-tractor and the autonomously operated shuttle in 
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Las Vegas, Nevada, was the truck driver’s action of backing into an alley, and his 
expectation that the shuttle would stop at a sufficient distance from his vehicle to allow 
him to complete his backup maneuver. Contributing to the cause of the collision was the 
attendant’s not being in a position to take manual control of the vehicle in an emergency. 
(​NTSB, 2019​, page 16) 
Analyst’s Synopsis​: This case shows that the human operator can be situationally 
aware while still being complacent. The operator stopped the vehicle, but there was still 
a long pause before the accident occurred, and because the vehicle controller had been 
stored in a place that was not easy to access, he did not intervene even as he realized 
the truck was going to hit the shuttle. 
Keolis response​: As a result of the accident, Keolis made it a policy to require 
attendants to have the controller available throughout the ride, rather than tucked away 
as it was during the incident. 
Swiss cheese analysis of Case B 






AV had Lidar, radar, sonar and cameras 
to detect vehicles and obstacles, and 
software powered by a neural network to 
classify objects and predict trajectories It 
could not deviate from its path, and was 
programmed to stop within 3M of any 
obstacle. The attendant would navigate 
around the obstacle and back to its path. 
Navya identified the truck at 45M, 
slowed as it came within 30M of 
the semi backed into the alley. It 
aimed to come to a stop at a 
distance of 3M from a vehicle that 




The AV was programmed to handle 
normal activities of driving including 
reacting to pedestrians. It had control of 
steering acceleration and braking, and a 
maximum speed of 16 MPH (Navya, 
2019) 
AV was not capable of backing up 
autonomously or beeping to tell the 
vehicle to stop. 
LF limitation 
AV level of 
automatio
n 
L4 automation is designed to handle all 
situations independently, though generally 
according to some geographical 
constraints. In this case, the shuttle could 
The Navya was aware that the 
semi was there, but only slowed as 
it continued to approach the truck 











L4 automation is not designed to request 
human take-over, and should be able to 
handle all events on the road. 
AV offered no alert or notification 






Human operator should be unnecessary in 
L4 automation. Navya was equipped for a 
handheld controller in case of system 
failure. 
Human operator stated that his 
primary role was to answer 
questions about the shuttle for 





Other people on the road must respond 
appropriately 
The truck driver was aware of the 
Navya, and that it was an AV, but 
was focused on whether any 
vehicles would be blocking the 
path into the alley. Driver was cited 
for improperly backing a vehicle. 





The attendant was trained to control the 
AV with a handheld controller, but his 
primary role was to serve as a tour guide 
and steer the vehicle to and from the 
designated route for the day. 
Attendant was aware of the 
oncoming truck and hit one of the 











AV should detect and classify objects that 
obstruct its path. At L4 automation, it 
should not need to ask for help from the 
human operator. 
The AV acted as a L4 shuttle on a 
predetermined block in Las Vegas. 
It slowed dramatically, but it was in 
the path of the backing up truck. It 
was not able to take evasive 
maneuvers or beep the horn to 






The driver should initiate take-over as 
soon as they see anything unexpected 
happening on the road 
Attendant stop the shuttle, but did 
not navigate it out of the path of 






Situational Constraints: ​The human operator was not trained to take over in the face of 
an emergency, and his primary training about the operation of the shuttle was to 
navigate it to its path or around cars parked in its path. 
Uniqueness among Other Cases: ​This is the one case in which the human operator 
was aware and did take action, but was still unable to react effectively enough to alert 






Utility of case for developing theme 
1 Design Strong 
The system was unable to notify the human that there was a problem, even though it could not 
actively prevent the accident. The human was not trained to handle emergencies. 
2 Awareness Weak There is strong evidence that the human operator (and all shuttle passengers) were highly aware. 
3 Complacency Moderate The controller was kept in an inaccessible location. 
4 Limitations Strong 
Backing out of the way of the oncoming truck (evasive action) or honking the horn were both outside 
of the operational parameters of the shuttle. 
5 Take-over Strong The human did stop the shuttle, but was not able to access the controller in time for full take-over. 
Findings:  
● Partial autonomy cannot yet handle all scenarios 
● Human operators may be trained to trust the capability of partially autonomous 
systems, leading to sub-optimal take-over readiness. 
● Human operator awareness and vigilance may not be enough to prevent an 
accident when the system is not designed for take-over. 
● The design of the partially autonomous system failed to mitigate automation 
related complacency. 
● Human Operator’s ability to effectively react was impaired. 
● Take-over did not effectively happen 
Excerpts relevant to the multicase report: 
“The attendant said that he considered switching to manual mode to move the shuttle, but that he 
had very little time. He further stated that manual mode was not designed or intended to be used as 
an emergency mode. That statement was consistent with Keolis policy, as reported to NTSB 
investigators.” (page 12) 
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Case C: ​Tesla Model S, January 22, 2018 
Case Study Report Title: ​Rear-End Collision Between a Car Operating with Advanced 
Driver Assistance Systems and a Stationary Fire Truck, Culver City, California, January 
22, 2018. 
Summary of events​: “About 8:40 a.m. on Monday, January 22, 2018, a 2014 Tesla 
Model S P85 car was traveling in the high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane of southbound 
Interstate 405 (I-405) in Culver City, California. The Tesla was behind another vehicle. 
Because of a collision in the northbound freeway lanes that happened about 25 minutes 
earlier, a California Highway Patrol (CHP) vehicle was parked on the left shoulder of 
southbound I-405, and a Culver City Fire Department truck was parked diagonally 
across the southbound HOV lane. The emergency lights were active on both the CHP 
vehicle and the fire truck. When the vehicle ahead of the Tesla changed lanes to the 
right to go around the fire truck, the Tesla remained in the HOV lane, accelerated, and 
struck the rear of the fire truck at a recorded speed of about 31 mph.  
At the time of the crash, the fire truck was unoccupied. The Tesla driver did not report 
any injuries. The car was equipped with advanced driver assistance systems (ADASs), 
including Autopilot. Based on the driver’s statements and on performance data 
downloaded from the car after the crash, the Autopilot was engaged at the time of the 
collision.” (​NTSB, 2019​, page 1) 
Analyst’s Synopsis​: This case highlights the limitations of AI understanding. The 
system was not able to grasp the context of traffic merging to go around an obstacle in 
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its path. After the lead vehicle was able to shift out of the blocked lane, the AV 
immediately accelerated into the stopped fire truck. 
NTSB findings​: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the Culver City, California, rear-end crash was the Tesla driver’s lack of 
response to the stationary fire truck in his travel lane, due to inattention and overreliance 
on the vehicle’s advanced driver assistance system; the Tesla’s Autopilot design, which 
permitted the driver to disengage from the driving task; and the driver’s use of the 
system in ways inconsistent with guidance and warnings from the manufacturer.  (​NTSB, 
2019​, page 13-14) 
Swiss cheese analysis of Case C 





Tesla was equipped with radar, ultrasonic 
sensors and cameras to detect other 
vehicles and obstacles as well as software 
powered by a neural network to classify 
objects and predict trajectories 
Tesla’s documentation states 
“Traffic-Aware Cruise Control 
cannot detect all objects and may 
not brake/decelerate for stationary 
vehicles, especially... when ... a 
vehicle you are following moves 
out of your driving path and a 
stationary vehicle or object is in 
front of you” 
LF limitation 
AV function 
Tesla has traffic aware cruise control, 
autosteer and auto, lane change, along 
with emergency braking capabilities. 
Tesla was unable to respond 
quickly to a cut-out scenario, and 





n of human 
awareness 
Tesla uses hands on the steering wheel 
as an indicator that the human operator is 
aware. 
Tesla allowed the driver to go for 
extended periods of time without 







Driver must understand the requirements 
of level 2 automation. Level 2 automation 
requires the human to be aware and ready 
to take over at all times.  
Driver expressed understanding of 
the limitations of Autopilot, but had 
not made contact with the steering 
wheel for 3 minutes and 41 
seconds prior to the crash. 
LF Awareness, complacency  
3rd party 
condition 
Other drivers have to respond 
appropriately to road conditions 
 
Lead vehicle changed lanes 
abruptly, 3-4 seconds prior to the 
crash, to pass the fire engine, 
allowing very little time for the 
sensors to comprehend the 
LF Edge case 
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presence of an emergency vehicle 




Because the driver is operating an L2 AV, 
the human operator must serve as a 
fail-safe for functional failures on the part 
of the AV or 3rd parties 
Witnesses stated that the driver 
appeared to be looking down at 
his phone. Driver said it may have 
been a beverage or a bagel. He 
made contact 
AF Awareness, complacency 
AV 
behavior 
AV should detect and classify any objects 
that obstruct its movement. At L2 
automation it is not required to inform the 
human operator, as they are supposed to 
be alert and aware at all times. The radar 
and cameras need to agree about an 
obstruction for very fast response of 
emergency brakes 
Tesla failed to classify the fire 
apparatus as an obstruction. Due 
to a lead vehicle rapidly exiting the 
lane, the Tesla did not 
immediately recognize the 






The driver should initiate take-over as 
soon as they see anything unexpected 
happening on the road 
No touch or torque was detected 
on the steering wheel and no 
pressure applied to the pedals of 
the Tesla prior to the crash. 
AF Take-over, awareness 
Situational Constraints: ​This situation started with what’s known as a “cut-out” 
scenario in which the lead vehicle shifted lanes abruptly to avoid the fire engine. The AV 
accelerated into the space left by the lead vehicle before it could classify the fire engine 
in its path. 
Uniqueness among Other Cases: ​In this case, the driver was alive and able to account 
for his behavior prior to the accident. 
Theme Prominence of theme Utility of case for developing theme 
1 Design Strong Tesla allowed the human operator extended periods of time without contact with the 
wheel. 
2 Awareness Strong Driver conceded he was not looking at the road prior to the accident. 
3 Complacency Strong NTSB determined over-reliance in Autopilot was a factor. 
4 Limitations Strong System could not handle a cut-out scenario and actually accelerated toward a parked fire 
engine. 
5 Take-over Strong Take-over did not happen. 
Findings:  
● Partial autonomy cannot yet handle all scenarios 
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● Human operators learn to trust the capability of partially autonomous systems, 
becoming complacent and failing to maintain vigilance 
● Absent a clear indication that there is a problem, the human is unlikely to detect 
an obstacle that is not detected by the system. 
● The design of the partially autonomous system failed to mitigate automation 
related complacency. 
● Human operator was not aware of the hazard with ample time to react 
● Human Operator’s ability to effectively react was impaired. 
● Take-over did not effectively happen 
Excerpts relevant to the multicase report: 
“The NTSB… concluded that the way the Tesla Autopilot system monitored and responded to the 
driver’s interaction with the steering wheel was not an effective method of ensuring driver 
engagement.” (page 12) 
“NTSB concluded that because driving is an inherently visual task and a driver might touch the 
steering wheel without assessing the roadway, traffic conditions, or vehicle performance, 
monitoring steering wheel torque provides a poor surrogate means of determining a driver’s degree 
of engagement with the driving task.” (page 12)  
“In this crash, the driver’s lack of braking and steering in response to the stopped fire truck, his 
statement that he never saw the fire truck, and his potential in-vehicle distractions (bagel, cup of 
coffee, radio) all suggest that the driver was not attending to the driving task before the crash.” 
(page 13)  
“The driver described the Autopilot technology as reliable and added that the name “Autopilot” did 
not accurately describe the technology because the car did not fully drive itself.” (page 4) 
Case D: ​Uber Volvo XC90, March 18, 2018 
Case Study Report Title: NTSB (2018). ​PRELIMINARY REPORT HIGHWAY 
HWY18MH010. 
Case Study Report Title: ​Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental 
Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona 
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Summary of events​: “About 9:58 p.m., on Sunday, March 18, 2018, an Uber 
Technologies, Inc. test vehicle, based on a modified 2017 Volvo XC90 and operating 
with a self-driving system in computer control mode, struck a pedestrian on northbound 
Mill Avenue, in Tempe, Maricopa County, Arizona. The Uber test vehicle was occupied 
by one vehicle operator, a 44-year-old female. No passengers were in the vehicle.” 
(​NTSB, 2018​ page 1) 
The pedestrian crossed an unlit street in front of an oncoming vehicle, and did not 
appear to be aware that there was a car coming (forward facing dashcam shows that 
she did not look at the car at any point prior to impact). The human operator did not look 
up or apply the brakes until after the impact. 
NTSB findings​: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 
cause of the crash in Tempe, Arizona, was the failure of the vehicle operator to monitor 
the driving environment and the operation of the automated driving system because she 
was visually distracted throughout the trip by her personal cell phone. Contributing to the 
crash were the Uber Advanced Technologies Group’s (1) inadequate safety risk 
assessment procedures, (2) ineffective oversight of vehicle operators, and (3) lack of 
adequate mechanisms for addressing operators automation complacency​ all a 
consequence of its inadequate safety culture. Further factors contributing to the crash 
were (1) the impaired pedestrian’s crossing of N. Mill Avenue outside a crosswalk, and 
(2) the Arizona Department of Transportations insufficient oversight of automated vehicle 
testing. (​NTSB, 2019​ page 4) 
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Analyst’s Synopsis​: Vehicle ‘saw’ the pedestrian with 6 seconds notice, but did not 
accurately classify her until 1.3 secs prior to impact. This is in part due to the shape of a 
pedestrian walking a bicycle being unusual. 
Über response​: Über immediately discontinued testing for 8 months. In that time, they 
issued a 70 page safety report describing the design and implementation of their AV 
testing. They also added co-pilot to every test vehicle who could serve as an additional 
fail-safe against complacency on the part of the human operator. 
Swiss cheese analysis of Case D 





Uber Volvo was equipped with Lidar, radar, 
sonar and cameras to detect other vehicles 
and obstacles as well as software powered 
by a neural network to classify objects and 
predict trajectories 
Uber failed to classify a 
pedestrian walking a bicycle 
properly until 1.3 seconds prior 
to the crash 
LF limitation 
AV function 
The AV was programmed to handle normal 
activities of driving including reacting to 
pedestrians. It had control of steering 
acceleration and braking. The Volvo had an 
emergency braking system which  was 
disabled when the AV system was 
activated.  
Because the AV was supposed 
to be supervised, it did not have 
an alert to notify the driver 
about the obstacle on the road, 
even after it failed to classify 
her. 
LF design 
AV level of 
automation 
In L2 automation, the driver is considered 
the operator, but in L3, the human is there 
to actively take over when requested.  
The Über was primarily 
behaving as a full AV, but was 
not able to emergency stop, nor 







The Über was equipped with dashcams to 
record supervisor behavior, and to see what 
they saw out the windshield. 
The human operator was not 
deterred by being recorded, AV 
had no way of monitoring her 
awareness 




model of AV 
Driver must understand the requirements of 
level 3 automation. Level 3 automation 
requires the human to be aware and ready 
to take over at all times. 
Driver clearly had confidence in 
the capabilities of the vehicle as 
she was watching her phone at 
the time of the crash 
LF Complacency, awareness 
3rd party 
behavior 
Other people on the road must respond 
appropriately 
The pedestrian walked out onto 
an unlit road in front of 
oncoming headlights 
AF Edge case 
3rd party 
condition 
Other people on the road must be able to 
respond appropriately 
The pedestrian tested positive 







In L2 automation, the driver is considered 
the operator, but in L3, the human must be 
prepared to take-over in an 
Human was not looking up, no 
torque to the wheel or pressure 
to the brake was detected until 
2/10 sec prior to impact 
AF Complacency, awareness 
AV 
capability 
AV should detect and classify objects that 
obstruct its path. 
AV failed to classify the 






The driver should initiate take-over as soon 
as they see anything unexpected happening 
on the road 
Human operator attempted to 
turn left 2/10 secons prior to 
impact 
AF Take-over, awareness 
Situational Constraints: ​The crash took place on an unlit road at 10PM. Visibility would 
have been limited. 
Uniqueness among Other Cases: ​This is the one case where video evidence is readily 
available revealing the complacency of a human operator during operation of a partially 
autonomous vehicle. Additionally, it shows the potential for a system to be released with 
seemingly L3 autonomy, but without a mechanism for the system to request take-over. 
Theme Prominence 
of theme 
Utility of case for developing theme 
1 Design Strong 
Über had disabled emergency braking when the self driving system was engaged (automation bias in system 
design). Über chose to reduce two human operators to one, and did not check dashcam videos (design to 
discourage complacency). 
2 Awareness Strong Internal dascham confirms that the human operator was looking down and away from the windshield prior to the accident. 
3 Complacency Strong With a pedestrian crossing in front of the vehicle, the human did not react until 2/10 seconds prior to impact. 
4 Limitations Strong 
The system was unable to classify a pedestrian crossing the street with a bicycle for 4.7 of the 6 seconds 
prior to the crash. It was unable to alert the human that it was struggling to classify an object in its path. 
5 Take-over Strong Take-over occurred without sufficient time to save the pedestrian. 
Findings:  
● Partial autonomy cannot yet handle all scenarios 
● Human operators learn to trust the capability of partially autonomous systems, 
becoming complacent and failing to maintain vigilance 
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● Absent a clear indication that there is a problem, the human is unlikely to detect 
an obstacle that is not detected by the system. 
● The design of the partially autonomous system failed to mitigate automation 
related complacency. 
● Human operator was not aware of the hazard with ample time to react 
● Human Operator’s ability to effectively react was impaired. 
● Take-over did not effectively happen 
Excerpts relevant to the multicase report: 
“Encourage [states] to... require developers to submit an application for testing automated driving 
system (ADS)-equipped vehicles that, at a minimum, details a plan to manage the risk associated 
with crashes and operator inattentiveness” (page 5 
“The ADS detected the pedestrian 5.6 seconds before impact. Although the ADS continued to track 
the pedestrian until the crash, it never accurately classified her as a pedestrian or predicted her 
path” (page 1) 
“By the time the ADS determined that a collision was imminent, the situation exceeded the 
response specifications of the ADS braking system.” (page 1) 
Cross-case summary 
Our findings demonstrate a consistent mismatch between human operator awareness 
and the system’s need for oversight. This can largely be attributed to automation bias in 
the design of each system. Despite the potential for AVs to improve overall safety on 
roadways, for a car to be able to handle edge cases during levels 2 and 3 automation, 
the human operator must have enough awareness to take over control of the AV with 
little or no notice. However, at no point during any of these accidents did the AV request 
take-over from the human operator, and the human operator did not take control of the 
vehicle in any case with sufficient time to prevent an accident (in fact, the Über crash 
was the only scenario in which the human touched the controls prior to the accident at 
all). In cases C and D, the human operators were not aware that they were about to be 
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in an accident; the absence of contact with the wheel in case A suggests the same. 
Below, you will see how each theme is supported across all of the cases. For combined 
support, each case’s support for the theme is rated Weak, Moderate, or Strong. 
Utility of Cases 
Original Multicase Themes Case A Case B Case C Case D 
Theme 1: Design Strong Strong Strong Strong 
Theme 2: Awareness Strong Weak Strong Strong 
Theme 3: Complacency Strong Moderate Strong Strong 
Theme 4: Limitations Strong Strong Strong Strong 
Theme 5: Take-over Strong Strong Strong Strong 
The findings from each case are merged below to show where findings are consistent 
across cases, and which theme or themes are best supported by those findings. Most 
findings are consistent between cases, however there are some findings unique to Case 
B (the Navya shuttle), in which the vehicle was meant to operate at a much higher level 





Thematic support from cases 
1 2 3 4 5 
Absent a clear indication that there is a problem, the 
human is unlikely to detect an obstacle that is not 
detected by the system. 
A, C, D 75% 75%    
The design of the partially autonomous system failed to 
mitigate automation related complacency. 
A, B, C, 
D 100%  100%   
Human operators learn to trust the capability of partially 
autonomous systems, becoming complacent and failing to 
maintain vigilance 
A, C, D 75%  75%   
Human operators may be trained to trust the capability of 
partially autonomous systems, leading to sub-optimal 
take-over readiness. 
B 25%    25% 
Human operator was not aware of the hazard with ample 
time to react A, C, D  75%   25% 
Human Operator’s ability to effectively react was impaired. A, B, C, 
D 
  100%  100% 
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Human operator awareness and vigilance may not be 
enough to prevent an accident when the system is not 
designed for take-over. 
B   25%  25% 
Partial autonomy cannot yet handle all scenarios A, B, C, 
D 
   100%  
Take-over did not effectively happen A, B, C, 
D 
    100% 
We find strong evidence in each case and across all cases of automation bias (both in 
design and operation) and complacency during an unanticipated event in which neither 
the system nor the human operator were in control of the situation. ln each accident, we 
observe the same triad of events: 
1. A human operator whose ability to effectively react was impaired.​ They 
demonstrated some level of automation bias and were cognitively complacent; 
generally reliable performance of the AI caused the human’s mental model of the 
AI’s abilities to handle road conditions did not match the situation at hand. In 
most cases, the human operator was distracted. In the case of the Navya shuttle, 
the human operator was aware, but was neither trained nor prepared for 
take-over in an emergency. 
2. An AV that was not equipped to handle the problem on its own.​ The AV 
either did not have the capability to correctly classify obstacles in its path, the 
ability to react appropriately or to alert or request take-over from the driver if they 
did. 
3. Take-over did not happen.​ None of the AVs could alert the driver to the 
situation, nor did they have any way of knowing whether the human was aware 
enough to take over. The Tesla does uses hands on the wheel to confirm that the 
human is “driving”, but in each case, it allowed the human operator to release the 
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steering wheel for several minutes between alerts. Neither Über nor Navya 
actively used any form of monitoring of the human operator. 
These systems were built to allow human operators to be complacent and encouraged 
them to place their trust in the AV, but were unable to react appropriately to the system 
or to request take-over. Our findings reflect prior research into cognitive complacency 
and suggest that, as long as human operator awareness factors into AV accident 
response and prevention, the AV should be designed to augment operator awareness 
and to actively request take-over. 
Discussion 
Technological philosopher, Luciano Floridi has declared that we are entering a new era 
of humanity, what he calls the Turing Revolution, in which people are beginning to 
collaborate with non-human intelligent agents ​(Floridi, 2014​). Self driving cars are a real 
world example of this human-AI partnership, but the potential for benefit and harm 
expands beyond AVs into any number of use cases where automation could improve 
safety, efficiency, or output. Human drivers are being told that the system is safer than 
they are while it is their job to monitor it, this role has been called an impossible task, 
and can lead to as many complications as it relieves (​Bainbridge, 1983​). The 
complacency of human monitors of automated systems, automation bias, and 




What are the impediments in establishing common ground between 
human and AI in partnership? 
Breakdowns offer a unique perspective on system shortcomings. We have an 
opportunity to l We believe that AVs can serve as an analogy for many human-AI 
partnerships that involve real-world consequences, and that the lessons we take from 
the breakdown in human-AV interaction can help to realize that promise across all 
applications of AI. 
We have to better understand AI communication with human operators. While the AI 
tracks input from multiple sources simultaneously, is constantly vigilant, and ready to 
take-over operation without notice, it also tends to behave as a black box, with no clear 
understanding of how it arrived at the decisions it is making (​Lu et al., 2018​), which can 
lead to serious and unintended errors and biases (​O’Neill, 2016​). AIs also have limited 
parameters for operation, and tend to respond erratically and unpredictably when faced 
with unexpected new situations. Humans are able to take-over and respond to 
unexpected circumstances intuitively,  decisively, and creatively (Jarrahi, 2018). Humans 
also have limited focus, are susceptible to distraction and cognitive complacency 
(​Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010​), and need time to gain situational awareness 
(​Endsley, 2010​). The purpose of Human-AI symbiosis is to improve the overall 
performance of a human as they interact with the world (​Jarrahi, 2018​), so AI design 
should use the strengths of AI to bolster the weaknesses of human operators while also 
recognizing the AIs limitations, and the role of human operator awareness in safe and 
efficient operation. It is the latter situation that seems lacking in the design of the AVs 
involved in these accidents. 
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The model for SAE levels of vehicle autonomy should serve as a model for the evolution 
of AI in general (​Libert et al., 2019​), with level 0 representing traditional tools and level 6 
representing fully autonomous systems. In many cases, L5 is the long term dream and 
promise of AI, but in some, symbiotic augmentation of human performance is the goal 
(​Jarrahi et al., 2018​). We are already seeing the introduction of L1 autonomy in 
everything from appliances to email inboxes. Many believe that the increased 
functionalities will lead many of these systems to upgrade to L2 and beyond, perhaps in 
the near future (​Müller and Bostrom, 2016​).  
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
No automation 
Machine 




























human is not 
required 
Human is driving System is driving 
▉ ​AV’s need for human operator awareness based on system design 
▉​ ​Reasonable expectation of human operator’s awareness based on findings 
At L2 and L3 autonomy, the system begins to behave as a cognitive agent, and is 
therefore susceptible to automation bias and complacency. Unfortunately it is still reliant 
on human supervision to avoid serious errors. This mismatch is depicted in the table 
above. For many industries, this could introduce an unfamiliar level of risk or liability 
(​Thimbleby, 1994​) that did not exist when the system or service was a simple tool rather 
than a cognitive agent. 
As they develop greater capability, people will want to capitalize on the strengths of AI, 
including consistency, 24/7 availability, speed of decision making. As AIs granted greater 
autonomy, the humans operating them will build trust in the automation and gradually 
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tend to increasing cognitive complacency. Not all human-AI partnerships will be critical to 
safety or efficiency (e.g., chess centaurs), but there is a promise of saving lives, time and 
money that make increasing autonomy and human augmentation attractive if not 
inevitable.  
Take-over 
Looking at breakdowns show us situations in which take-over failed to happen. AI 
take-over, when appropriately timed and coordinated can improve output and efficiency. 
For example, the human can hand off much of the routine processes to the system and, 
in doing so, focus on higher level tasks. However, first and foremost, take-over is a 
safety mechanism of any automated system. In fact, because human-AI partnerships 
allows for the opportunity for humans and AI to collaborate, they may allow for added 
safety mechanisms, in which either partner can take enough control to avoid an 
emergency. The AI, identifying a complacent human partner should pause operation, 
just as an aware human operator should recognize a hazard that is outside of the AI’s 
operational parameters, and initiate take-over. 
Awareness 
When a human partners with an AI, there is an assumption of some amount of common 
ground between the two. The AI’s operational parameters must align with the human 
operator’s mental model of the AI’s capabilities. We repeatedly found mismatches 
between drivers’ mental models of AVs and their capabilities, with costly, sometimes 
fatal, outcomes. Similarly, the AVs were designed to operate under the assumption that 
the human operator would be vigilant, aware, and ready for take-over if needed (clearly 
contradicted by the research), but were not designed to confirm that level of vigilance 
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during operation. The human operator in a L2 or L3 AI partnership is not a passenger, 
but if they begin to act like one, they are no longer in a position to take over control when 
they are needed. 
In the coming decades, AI will likely be tasked to assist humans in many walks of life, as 
virtual colleagues, in-home helpers, surgical robots and the various aspects of smart 
cities. In some of these cases the systems will be able to function autonomously, but 
more often, there will be a human in the loop, cooperating and collaborating with the AI. 
Inevitably, every AI system will encounter edge cases in which it cannot properly react. 
Without a clear understanding of the situation, a complacent human operator will not be 
able to take over in time to avoid an accident. Many of these accidents will have the 
potential to cost money, productivity or lives. 
How does the design of intelligent machines contribute to these 
breakdowns? 
Automated systems are prone to automation bias. The system runs the show right up 
until an unexpected event that requires a decision that is beyond the design or 
capabilities of the system to respond, and at that point the human is expected to 
take-over. However, none of the systems we analyzed offered any warning to the human 
prior to breakdown, and all of the systems performed roughly in accordance with their 
design. The human and the system were not communicating, and this allowed 
preventable accidents to occur. Grounding in communication (​Clark, 1991​) holds that 
mutual knowledge, mutual beliefs, and  mutual assumptions are an integral constraint of 
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communication. In the case of human-AI communication, just as with humans, much of 
that communication is non-verbal, and much of it is not understood by the other party. 
Mutual assumptions: ​We consistently found that the assumptions underlying the human 
operator’s interactions with the AI were not reflected by the AI’s design, and that the AI’s 
design was reliant on a level of awareness that was not reflected by the human operator. 
Mutual knowledge: ​The human did not know that the system was out of its depth and 
failing to understand the situation, and the system had no real indication of its human 
operator’s level of awareness at the time of failure. 
Mutual belief:​ In our findings, at times it appeared that both the human and the AVs 
operated as though the other was driving. 
To achieve this level of mutual assumptions, knowledge and beliefs, we propose the 
following design model, which is two fold: 
The AI system​: in parallel with its primary function, should clearly display its reasoning 
process (​Goddard et al., 2011​) and status so that they are obvious and actionable to the 
human operator. It should also monitor the human operator’s level of awareness using 
tested and demonstrable indicators (eg. the NTSB stated that Tesla’s monitoring of 
hands on the wheel are a poor surrogate for driver awareness (​NTSB November 2019​, 
page 12)).  
The human:​ in parallel with their job, should monitor the AI’s behavior while modeling 






This reciprocal monitoring that is routinized and measured should provide a mechanism 
that reinforces situational awareness in the way unstructured automation contributes to 
bias and complacency (​Parasurman & Menzey, 2010​). This, combined with a culture of 
safety (​Skitka & Mosier, 2000​), and operator knowledge (​Bond et al., 2018​) and 
experience (​Goddard et al., 2011​) may decrease the likelihood of avoidable failures. 
How does operator automation bias confound take-over? 
Research into cognitive complacency and trust in automation suggest that a “chatty 
operator” (​Wachtel, 2018​), including system prompts and frequent communication of its 
status and choices can significantly improve operator awareness (​Bazilinskyy et al., 
2018​, ​Lu et al., 2016​), but ultimately the fact that a human is monitoring that system 
leads to delayed responses. If the ​functional status of an AI ​is dependent on the 
awareness of a human operator​, then those would serve as 2 predictable slices in any 
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swiss cheese analysis of accidents involving L1-L4 human-AI partnerships. In those 
situations, optimal performance would occur when the human is highly aware and the 
system is functioning optimally. 
 The AI is working The AI is not working (it is constrained or impaired) 
Human is aware 
(paying attention) 
Multiple defenses in place- this is 
optimal performance. 
Human takes over, maintains safety. 
This is suboptimal performance. 
Human is complacent 
or incapacitated 
AI maintains safety or terminates 
operations. This may be suboptimal 
performance. 
Likelihood of dangerous outcome is 
dramatically increased, neither human 
nor system is actively operating. 
If the AI is functioning within its parameters and the human partner is vigilant, the system 
achieves AI collaboration, and the risk of catastrophic failure is reduced. If either status 
changes, the risk of accident is greater, but there is still a safeguard; if both change, the 
likelihood of an accident is significant. 
To prevent accidents, the principle of the SCM is to add slices and plug holes. In this 
case, the extra slices could consistently include two additions to any system: 
1. Clear and highly visible communication of AI system status to the human 
operator, which has been shown to mitigate cognitive complacency and improve 
performance of Human-AI partnership. 
2. System monitoring of human level of awareness. This may involve eye-tracking, 
monitoring human activity or vital signs. 
In AV breakdowns, neither the human nor the AI were aware of the other’s impaired 
states, so take-over did not occur. Communicating the AI system status to the human 
operator should improve human awareness, while monitoring the human operator’s 
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awareness should help the AI to be able to stop operation when the human is not 
available for take-over. 
Implications for design 
Given the similarities among the breakdowns we have analyzed, there is compelling 
reason for a dialogue with designers of complex, automated, intelligent systems, in order 
to ensure that they recognize the behavior of their system when it struggles with 
classification or decision making, and to actively mitigate automation bias in the design 
of the system. This should help to ensure a reasonable level of awareness from its 
human partner, and to ensure that take-over occurs before hazards become losses. 
If designers want situational awareness to match the levels needed for safe and effective 
take-over in the face of unexpected circumstances or system failure, there is a need to 
design for take-over readiness. 
Designers of partially autonomous (L2-3) AI tools cannot behave as toolmakers 
anymore; they are constructing cognitive agents and there is a need to consider impacts 
of their design, and refrain from implementing new systems “because we can” without 
also considering concepts about human awareness and complacency, automation bias, 
and a clear understanding and communication of when and how the human partner 
should initiate take-over. 
Limitations 
This research was based on the 4 most well documented AV accidents. To date, there 
have been very few AV accidents, and even fewer that were thoroughly documented and 
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publicly reported, but in all likelihood, they will continue to happen. It is possible that 
more nuanced and complex findings will be possible as AVs expand operation 
throughout the US and globally and as automakers like Tesla continue to expand the AV 
capabilities of their existing fleets. It will also be helpful to analyze human - AI 
breakdowns in other fields where efficiency and safety were factors for verification. 
Future research 
Third parties interacting with AIs they perceive to be human operators may make false 
assumptions about the AI’s actions (​Rodríguez Palmeiro et al., 2018​). In this event, an 
autonomous system must take action or request intervention, and the abilities and 
limitations of the system could determine the outcome of the critical incident. 
As human-AI partnership becomes more common, there may be a need to understand 
how interaction between human-AI teams and other humans might occur. Certainly in 
the field of AVs, there is a need to understand the way in which people respond to AVs; 
Would they behave differently if they knew that the car coming down the road has a 
complacent driver who may or may not be watching the road? Would those findings also 
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